Washington had met defeat in every considerable battle at which he was personally present.His first appearance in military history, in the Ohio campaign against the French, twenty-two years before the Revolution, was marked by a defeat, the surrender of Fort Necessity.Again in the next year, when he fought to relieve the disaster to Braddock's army, defeat was his portion.Defeat had pursued him in the battles of the Revolution --before New York, at the Brandywine, at Germantown.The campaign against Canada, which he himself planned, had failed.He had lost New York and Philadelphia.But, like William III of England, who in his long struggle with France hardly won a battle and yet forced Louis XIV to accept his terms of peace, Washington, by suddenness in reprisal, by skill in resource when his plans seemed to have been shattered, grew on the hard rock of defeat the flower of victory.
There was never a time when Washington was not trusted by men of real military insight or by the masses of the people.But a general who does not win victories in the field is open to attack.By the winter of 1777 when Washington, with his army reduced and needy, was at Valley Forge keeping watch on Howe in Philadelphia, John Adams and others were talking of the sin of idolatry in the worship of Washington, of its flavor of the accursed spirit of monarchy, and of the punishment which "the God of Heaven and Earth" must inflict for such perversity.Adams was all against a Fabian policy and wanted to settle issues forever by a short and strenuous war.The idol, it was being whispered, proved after all to have feet of clay.One general, and only one, had to his credit a really great victory--Gates, to whom Burgoyne had surrendered at Saratoga, and there was a movement to replace Washington by this laureled victor.
General Conway, an Irish soldier of fortune, was one of the most troublesome in this plot.He had served in the campaign about Philadelphia but had been blocked in his extravagant demands for promotion; so he turned for redress to Gates, the star in the north.A malignant campaign followed in detraction of Washington.
He had, it was said, worn out his men by useless marches; with an army three times as numerous as that of Howe, he had gained no victory; there was high fighting quality in the American army if properly led, but Washington despised the militia; a Gates or a Lee or a Conway would save the cause as Washington could not; and so on."Heaven has determined to save your country or a weak general and bad counsellors would have ruined it"; so wrote Conway to Gates and Gates allowed the letter to be seen.The words were reported to Washington, who at once, in high dudgeon, called Conway to account.An explosion followed.Gates both denied that he had received a letter with the passage in question, and, at the same time, charged that there had been tampering with his private correspondence.He could not have it both ways.Conway was merely impudent in reply to Washington, but Gates laid the whole matter before Congress.Washington wrote to Gates, in reply to his denials, ironical references to "rich treasures of knowledge and experience" "guarded with penurious reserve" by Conway from his leaders but revealed to Gates.There was no irony in Washington's reference to malignant detraction and mean intrigue.At the same time he said to Gates: "My temper leads me to peace and harmony with all men," and he deplored the internal strife which injured the great cause.Conway soon left America.Gates lived to command another American army and to end his career by a crowning disaster.
Washington had now been for more than two years in the chief command and knew his problems.It was a British tradition that standing armies were a menace to liberty, and the tradition had gained strength in crossing the sea.Washington would have wished a national army recruited by Congress alone and bound to serve for the duration of the war.There was much talk at the time of a "new model army" similar in type to the wonderful creation of Oliver Cromwell.The Thirteen Colonies became, however, thirteen nations.Each reserved the right to raise its own levies in its own way.To induce men to enlist Congress was twice handicapped.
First, it had no power of taxation and could only ask the States to provide what it needed.The second handicap was even greater.
When Congress offered bounties to those who enlisted in the Continental army, some of the States offered higher bounties for their own levies of militia, and one authority was bidding against the other.This encouraged short-term enlistments.If a man could re-enlist and again secure a bounty, he would gain more than if he enlisted at once for the duration of the war.
