Macdonald was offered and accepted with misgivings a post as one of the five British Commissioners.He pressed the traditional Canadian policy of offering fishery for trade privileges but found no backing in this or other matters from his British colleagues, and he met only unyielding opposition from the American Commissioners.He fell back, under protest, on a settlement of narrower scope, which permitted reciprocity in navigation and bonding privileges, free admission of Canadian and Newfoundland fish to United States markets and of American fishermen to Canadian and Newfoundland waters, and which provided for a subsidiary commission to fix the amount to be paid by the United States for the surplus advantage thus received.The Fenian Raids claims were not even considered, and Macdonald was angered by this indifference on the part of his British colleagues."They seem to have only one thing in their minds, " he reported privately to Ottawa, "that is, to go home to England with a treaty in their pocket, settling everything, no matter at what cost to Canada." Yet when the time came for the Canadian Parliament to decide whether to ratify the fishery clauses of the Treaty of Washington in which the conclusions of the commission were embodied, Macdonald, in spite of the unpopularity of the bargain in Canada, "urged Parliament" to accept the treaty, accept it with all its imperfections, to accept it for the sake of peace and for the sake of the great Empire of which we form a part." The treaty was ratified in 1871 by all the powers concerned; and the stimulus to the peaceful settlement of international disputes given by the Geneva Tribunal which followed* justified the subordination of Canada's specific interests.
* See "The Path of Empire"
A change in party now followed in Canada, but the new Government under Alexander Mackenzie "was as fully committed as the Government of Sir John Macdonald to the policy of bartering fishery for trade advantage.Canada therefore proposed that instead of carrying out the provisions for a money settlement, the whole question should be reopened.The Administration at Washington was sympathetic.George Brown was appointed along with the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Thornton, to open negotiations.Under Brown's energetic leadership a settlement of all outstanding issues was drafted in 1874, which permitted freedom of trade in natural and in most manufactured products for twenty-one years, and settled fishery, coasting trade, navigation, and minor boundary issues.But diplomats proposed, and the United States Senate disposed.Protectionist feeling was strong at Washington, and the currency problem absorbing, and hence this broad and statesmanlike essay in neighborliness could not secure an hour's attention.This plan having failed, the Canadian Government fell back on the letter of the treaty.ACommission which consisted of the Honorable E.H.Kellogg representing the United States, Sir Alexander T.Galt representing Canada, and the Belgian Minister to Washington, M.
Delfosse, as chairman, awarded Canada and Newfoundland $5,500,000as the excess value of the fisheries for the ten years the arrangement was to run.The award was denounced in the United States as absurdly excessive; but a sense of honor and the knowledge that millions of dollars from the Alabama award were still in the Treasury moved the Senate finally to acquiesce, though only for the ten-year term fixed by treaty.In Canada the award was received with delight as a signal proof that when left to themselves Canadians could hold their own.The prevailing view was well summed up in a letter from Mackenzie to the Canadian representative on the Halifax commission, written shortly before the decision: "I am glad you still have hopes of a fair verdict.
I am doubly anxious to have it, first, because we are entitled to it and need the dollars, and, second, because it will be the first Canadian diplomatic triumph, and will justify me in insisting that we know our neighbors and our own business better than any Englishmen."Mackenzie's insistence that Canada must take a larger share in the control of her foreign affairs was too advanced a stand for many of his more conservative countrymen.For others, he did not go far enough.The early seventies saw the rise of a short-lived movement in favor of Canadian independence.To many independence from England seemed the logical sequel to Confederation; and the rapid expansion of Canadian territory over half a continent stimulated national pride and national self-consciousness Opinion in England regarding Canadian independence was still more outspoken.There imperialism was at its lowest ebb.With scarcely an exception, English politicians, from Bright to Disraeli, were hostile or indifferent to connection with the colonies, which had now ceased to be a trade asset and had clearly become a military liability.
But no concrete problem arose to make the matter a political issue.In England a growing uneasiness over the protectionist policies and the colonial ambitions of her European rivals were soon to revive imperial sentiment.In Canada the ties of affection for the old land, as well as the inertia fostered by long years of colonial dependence, kept the independence movement from spreading far.For the time the rising national spirit found expression in economic rather than political channels.The protectionist movement which a few years later swept all Canada before it owed much of its strength to its claim to be the national policy.
But it was not imperial or foreign relations that dominated public interest in the seventies.Domestic politics were intensely absorbing and bitterly contested.Within five years there came about two sudden and sweeping reversals of power.
