If any one is going to suppose that an argument which turns upon ambiguity is a refutation，it will be impossible for an answerer to escape being refuted in a sense：for in the case of visible objects one is bound of necessity to deny the term one has asserted，and to assert what one has denied.For the remedy which some people have for this is quite unavailing.They say，not that Coriscus is both musical and unmusical，but that this Coriscus is musical and this Coriscus unmusical.But this will not do，for to say ”this Coriscus is unmusical”，or ”musical”，and to say ”this Coriscus” is so，is to use the same expression：and this he is both affirming and denying at once.”But perhaps they do not mean the same.” Well，nor did the ****** name in the former case：so where is the difference？If,however，he is to ascribe to the one person the ****** title ”Coriscus”，while to the other he is to add the prefix ”one” or”this”，he commits an absurdity：for the latter is no more applicable to the one than to the other：for to whichever he adds it，it makes no difference.
All the same，since if a man does not distinguish the senses of an amphiboly，it is not clear whether he has been confuted or has not been confuted，and since in arguments the right to distinguish them is granted，it is evident that to grant the question simply without drawing any distinction is a mistake，so that，even if not the man himself，at any rate his argument looks as though it had been refuted.
It often happens，however，that，though they see the amphiboly，people hesitate to draw such distinctions，because of the dense crowd of persons who propose questions of the kind，in order that they may not be thought to be obstructionists at every turn：then，though they would never have supposed that that was the point on which the argument turned，they often find themselves faced by a paradox.
Accordingly，since the right of drawing the distinction is granted,one should not hesitate，as has been said before.
If people never made two questions into one question，the fallacy that turns upon ambiguity and amphiboly would not have existed either,but either genuine refutation or none.For what is the difference between asking ”Are Callias and Themistocles musical?” and what one might have asked if they，being different，had had one name？For if the term applied means more than one thing，he has asked more than one question.If then it be not right to demand simply to be given a single answer to two questions，it is evident that it is not proper to give a ****** answer to any ambiguous question，not even if the predicate be true of all the subjects，as some claim that one should.For this is exactly as though he had asked ”Are Coriscus and Callias at home or not at home?”，supposing them to be both in or both out：for in both cases there is a number of propositions：for though the ****** answer be true，that does not make the question one.For it is possible for it to be true to answer even countless different questions when put to one，all together with either a ”Yes” or a ”No”:
but still one should not answer them with a single answer：for that is the death of discussion.Rather，the case is like as though different things has actually had the same name applied to them.If then，one should not give a single answer to two questions，it is evident that we should not say simply ”Yes” or ”No” in the case of ambiguous terms either：for the remark is simply a remark，not an answer at all，although among disputants such remarks are loosely deemed to be answers，because they do not see what the consequence is.
As we said，then，inasmuch as certain refutations are generally taken for such，though not such really，in the same way also certain solutions will be generally taken for solutions，though not really such.Now these，we say，must sometimes be advanced rather than the true solutions in contentious reasonings and in the encounter with ambiguity.The proper answer in saying what one thinks is to say ”Granted”; for in that way the likelihood of being refuted on a side issue is minimized.If，on the other hand，one is compelled to say something paradoxical，one should then be most careful to add that ”it seems” so：for in that way one avoids the impression of being either refuted or paradoxical.Since it is clear what is meant by ”begging the original question”，and people think that they must at all costs overthrow the premisses that lie near the conclusion，and plead in excuse for refusing to grant him some of them that he is begging the original question，so whenever any one claims from us a point such as is bound to follow as a consequence from our thesis，but is false or paradoxical，we must plead the same：for the necessary consequences are generally held to be a part of the thesis itself.Moreover,whenever the universal has been secured not under a definite name，but by a comparison of instances，one should say that the questioner assumes it not in the sense in which it was granted nor in which he proposed it in the premiss：for this too is a point upon which a refutation often depends.
If one is debarred from these defences one must pass to the argument that the conclusion has not been properly shown，approaching it in the light of the aforesaid distinction between the different kinds of fallacy.
