mean the same; while others solve the argument of Zeno andParmenides by asserting that ”One” and ”Being” are used in a number ofsenses)，likewise also as regards fallacies of Accident and each ofthe other types，some of the arguments will be easier to see whileothers are more difficult; also to grasp to which class a fallacybelongs，and whether it is a refutation or not a refutation，is notequally easy in all cases.
An incisive argument is one which produces the greatestperplexity：for this is the one with the sharpest fang.Now perplexityis twofold，one which occurs in reasoned arguments，respecting whichof the propositions asked one is to demolish，and the other incontentious arguments，respecting the manner in which one is to assentto what is propounded.Therefore it is in syllogistic arguments thatthe more incisive ones produce the keenest heart—searching.Now asyllogistic argument is most incisive if from premisses that are asgenerally accepted as possible it demolishes a conclusion that isaccepted as generally as possible.For the one argument，if thecontradictory is changed about，makes all the resulting syllogismsalike in character：for always from premisses that are generallyaccepted it will prove a conclusion，negative or positive as thecase may be，that is just as generally accepted; and therefore oneis bound to feel perplexed.An argument，then，of this kind is themost incisive，viz.the one that puts its conclusion on all fours withthe propositions asked; and second comes the one that argues frompremisses，all of which are equally convincing：for this willproduce an equal perplexity as to what kind of premiss，of thoseasked，one should demolish.Herein is a difficulty：for one mustdemolish something，but what one must demolish is uncertain.Ofcontentious arguments，on the other hand，the most incisive is the onewhich，in the first place，is characterized by an initialuncertainty whether it has been properly reasoned or not; and alsowhether the solution depends on a false premiss or on the drawing of adistinction; while，of the rest，the second place is held by thatwhose solution clearly depends upon a distinction or a demolition，andyet it does not reveal clearly which it is of the premisses asked,whose demolition，or the drawing of a distinction within it，willbring the solution about，but even leaves it vague whether it is onthe conclusion or on one of the premisses that the deception depends.
Now sometimes an argument which has not been properly reasoned issilly，supposing the assumptions required to be extremely contraryto the general view or false; but sometimes it ought not to be held incontempt.For whenever some question is left out，of the kind that concerns both the subject and the nerve of the argument，the reasoning that has both failed to secure this as well，and also failed to reason properly，is silly; but when what is omitted is some extraneous question，then it is by no means to be lightly despised，but the argument is quite respectable，though the questioner has not put his questions well.
Just as it is possible to bring a solution sometimes against the argument，at others against the questioner and his mode of questioning，and at others against neither of these，likewise also it is possible to marshal one”s questions and reasoning both against the thesis，and against the answerer and against the time，whenever the solution requires a longer time to examine than the period available.
As to the number，then，and kind of sources whence fallacies arise in discussion，and how we are to show that our opponent is committing a fallacy and make him utter paradoxes; moreover，by the use of what materials solesci** is brought about，and how to question and what is the way to arrange the questions; moreover，as to the question what use is served by all arguments of this kind，and concerning the answerer”s part，both as a whole in general，and in particular how to solve arguments and solecisms—on all these things let the foregoing discussion suffice.It remains to recall our original proposal and to bring our discussion to a close with a few words upon it.
