Meg. And yet, Stranger, I perceive that I cannot say, without morethought, what I should call the government of Lacedaemon, for it seemsto me to be like a tyranny-the power of our Ephors is marvellouslytyrannical; and sometimes it appears to me to be of all cities themost democratical; and who can reasonably deny that it is anaristocracy? We have also a monarchy which is held for life, and issaid by all mankind, and not by ourselves only, to be the most ancientof all monarchies; and, therefore, when asked on a sudden, I cannotprecisely say which form of government the Spartan is.
Cle. I am in the same difficulty, Megillus; for I do not feelconfident that the polity of Cnosus is any of these.
Ath. The reason is, my excellent friends, that you really havepolities, but the states of which we were just now speaking are merelyaggregations of men dwelling in cities who are the subjects andservants of a part of their own state, and each of them is named afterthe dominant power; they are not polities at all. But if states are tobe named after their rulers, the true state ought to be called bythe name of the God who rules over wise men.
Cle. And who is this God?
Ath. May I still make use of fable to some extent, in the hopethat I may be better able to answer your question: shall I?
Cle. By all means.
Ath. In the primeval world, and a long while before the citiescame into being whose settlements we have described, there is saidto have been in the time of Cronos a blessed rule and life, of whichthe best-ordered of existing states is a copy.
Cle. It will be very necessary to hear about that.
Ath. I quite agree with you; and therefore I have introduced thesubject.
Cle. Most appropriately; and since the tale is to the point, youwill do well in giving us the whole story.
Ath. I will do as you suggest. There is a tradition of the happylife of mankind in days when all things were spontaneous and abundant.
And of this the reason is said to have been as follows:-Cronos knewwhat we ourselves were declaring, that no human nature invested withsupreme power is able to order human affairs and not overflow withinsolence and wrong. Which reflection led him to appoint not men butdemigods, who are of a higher and more divine race, to be the kingsand rulers of our cities; he did as we do with flocks of sheep andother tame animals. For we do not appoint oxen to be the lords ofoxen, or goats of goats; but we ourselves are a superior race, andrule over them. In like manner God, in his love of mankind, placedover us the demons, who are a superior race, and they with greatcase and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us, taking care us andgiving us peace and reverence and order and justice never failing,made the tribes of men happy and united. And this tradition, whichis true, declares that cities of which some mortal man and not Godis the ruler, have no escape from evils and toils. Still we must doall that we can to imitate the life which is said to have existed inthe days of Cronos, and, as far as the principle of immortality dwellsin us, to that we must hearken, both in private and public life, andregulate our cities and houses according to law, meaning by the veryterm "law," the distribution of mind. But if either a single person oran oligarchy or a democracy has a soul eager after pleasures anddesires-wanting to be filled with them, yet retaining none of them,and perpetually afflicted with an endless and insatiable disorder; andthis evil spirit, having first trampled the laws under foot, becomesthe master either of a state or of an individual-then, as I wassaying, salvation is hopeless. And now, Cleinias, we have toconsider whether you will or will not accept this tale of mine.
Cle. Certainly we will.
Ath. You are aware-are you not?-that there are of said to be as manyforms of laws as there are of governments, and of the latter we havealready mentioned all those which are commonly recognized. Now youmust regard this as a matter of first-rate importance. For what isto be the standard of just and unjust, is once more the point atissue. Men say that the law ought not to regard either militaryvirtue, or virtue in general, but only the interests and power andpreservation of the established form of government; this is thought bythem to be the best way of expressing the natural definition ofjustice.
Cle. How?
Ath. Justice is said by them to be the interest of the stronger.
Cle. Speak plainer.
Ath. I will:-"Surely," they say, "the governing power makes whateverlaws have authority in any state?"Cle. True.
Ath. "Well," they would add, "and do you suppose that tyranny ordemocracy, or any other conquering power, does not make thecontinuance of the power which is possessed by them the first orprincipal object of their laws?"Cle. How can they have any other?
Ath. "And whoever transgresses these laws is punished as anevil-doer by the legislator, who calls the laws just?"Cle. Naturally.
Ath. "This, then, is always the mode and fashion in which justiceexists."Cle. Certainly, if they are correct in their view.
Ath. Why, yes, this is one of those false principles of governmentto which we were referring.
Cle. Which do you mean?
Ath. Those which we were examining when we spoke of who ought togovern whom. Did we not arrive at the conclusion that parents ought togovern their children, and the elder the younger, and the noble theignoble? And there were many other principles, if you remember, andthey were not always consistent. One principle was this very principleof might, and we said that Pindar considered violence natural andjustified it.
Cle. Yes; I remember.
Ath. Consider, then, to whom our state is to be entrusted. For thereis a thing which has occurred times without number in states-Cle. What thing?
