5. Thou sayest， men cannot admire the sharpness of thy wits.—Be it so； but there are many other things of which thou canst not say， I am not formed for them by nature. Show those qualities then which are altogether in thy power： sincerity， gravity， endurance of labour， aversion to pleasure， contentment with thy portion and with few things， benevolence， frankness， no love of superfluity， freedom from trifling magnanimity. Dost thou not see how many qualities thou art immediately able to exhibit， in which there is no excuse of natural incapacity and unfitness， and yet thou still remainest voluntarily below the mark？ or art thou compelled through being defectively furnished by nature to murmur， and to be stingy， and to flatter， and to find fault with thy poor body， and to try to please men， and to make great display， and to be restless in thy mind？ No， by the gods： but thou mightest have been delivered from these things long ago. Only if in truth thou canst be charged with being rather slow and dull of comprehension， thou must exert thyself about this also， not neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure in thy dullness.
6. One man， when he has done a service to another， is ready to set it down to his account as a favour conferred. Another is not ready to do this， but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor， and he knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even know what he has done， but he is like a vine which has produced grapes， and seeks for nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit. As a horse when he has run， a dog when he has tracked the game， a bee when it has made the honey， so a man when he has done a good act， does not call out for others to come and see， but he goes on to another act， as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes in season.—Must a man then be one of these， who in a manner act thus without observing it？—Yes.—But this very thing is necessary， the observation of what a man is doing； for it may be said， it is characteristic of the social animal to perceive that he is working in a social manner， and indeed to wish that his social partner also should perceive it.—It is true what thou sayest， but thou dost not rightly understand what is now said； and for this reason thou wilt become one of those of whom I spoke before， for even they are misled by a certain show of reason. But if thou wilt choose to understand the meaning of what is said， do not fear that for this reason thou wilt omit any social act.
7. A prayer of the Athenians： Rain， rain， O dear Zeus， down on the plowed fields of the Athenians and on the plains.—In truth we ought not to pray at all， or we ought to pray in this simple and noble fashion.
8. Just as we must understand when it is said， That ？sculapius prescribed to this man horse-exercise， or bathing in cold water， or going without shoes， so we must understand it when it is said， That the nature of the universe prescribed to this man disease or mutilation or loss or anything else of the kind. For in the first case prescribed means something like this： he prescribed this for this man as a thing adapted to procure health； and in the second case it means， That which happens to [or suits] every man is fixed in a manner for him suitably to his destiny. For this is what we mean when we say that things are suitable to us， as the workmen say of squared stones in walls or the pyramids， that they are suitable， when they fit them to one another in some kind of connection. For there is altogether one fitness [harmony]. And as the universe is made up out of all bodies to be such a body as it is， so out of all existing causes necessity [destiny] is made up to be such a cause as it is. And even those who are completely ignorant understand what I mean， for they say， It [necessity， destiny] brought this to such a person.—This then was brought and this was prescribed to him. Let us then receive these things， as well as those which ？sculapius prescribes. Many， as a matter of course， even among his prescriptions， are disagreeable， but we accept them in the hope of health. Let the perfecting and accomplishment of the things， which the common nature judges to be good， be judged by thee to be of the same kind as thy health. And so accept everything which happens， even if it seem disagreeable， because it leads to this， to the health of the universe and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus [the universe]. For he would not have brought on any man what he has brought， if it were not useful for the whole. Neither does the nature of anything， whatever it may be， cause anything which is not suitable to that which is directed by it. For two reasons， then， it is right to be content with that which happens to thee； the one， because it was done for thee and prescribed for thee， and in a manner had reference to thee， originally from the most ancient causes spun with thy destiny； and the other， because even that which comes severally to every man is to the power which administers the universe a cause of felicity and perfection， nay even of its very continuance. For the integrity of the whole is mutilated， if thou cuttest off anything whatever from the conjunction and the continuity either of the parts or of the causes. And thou dost cut off， as far as it is in thy power， when thou art dissatisfied， and in a manner triest to put anything out of the way.
